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Is perception concept-dependent according to Kant?1
Anna Tomaszewska
In the contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, one can recognize a ten- 
dency, supported by the force of arguments of John McDowell, to read Kant as a 
philosopher who gives succour to some ideas of the so-called conceptualists, most 
importantly the idea that epistemically valuable representational content involves 
only conceptual content. This reading is based mainly on one "slogan" from the 
opening passages of Kant's Transcendental Logic and also, perhaps, on a specific 
understanding of several claims formulated in the transcendental deduction of the 
categories. What McDowell deems his "Kantian background" results, as I think, 
from a rather one-sided reading of Kant's theory of experience, although, it seems, 
passages may be found in the Critique o f  Pure Reason which also confirm the con- 
ceptualist interpretation. What I would consider McDowell's misreading resem- 
bles, to a degree, the Hegelian one. Hegel also, in my opinion, mistakenly draws 
attention, as in Glauben und Wissen2, to the fact that intuition and understanding 
are but two aspects or functions of one faculty, which is reason appearing in the 
sphere of empirical consciousness as transcendental imagination. In this way, he 
nullifies the methodological and epistemological importance of Kant's distinction 
between two, mutually irreducible, sources and forms of knowledge.
In this paper, I want to discuss some arguments in support of the following 
interpretative theses: (i) Kant did not identify representational content with con­
ceptual content; (ii) he distinguished a class of nonconceptual representations 
which necessarily underlie all representational content; and (iii) he did not explic- 
itly state that, for experience to occur, conceptual capacities need to be brought 
into play. In a word, thus, to make use of present-day labelling, Kant would be 
more sympathetic to the claims of nonconceptualists, rather than those made by 
their adversaries. This conclusion entails that representations, in the Kantian 
sense, refer to objects, i.e. possess the characteristic of intentionality (object-
1 This essay is a preparatory draft for a larger piece of work on Kant and perception. Part of the 
research I was able to carry out as a visiting student at the University of St Andrews in Spring 2007.
1 would like to thank Prof. Miłowit Kuniński, who supervises my PhD thesis at the Jagiellonian 
University, and Dr. Jens Timmermann, who supervised my research in St Andrews, for helpful 
advice and support for my endeavors in the field of Kant studies.
2 Cf. Hegel [1986] pp. 17-18, 20.
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directedness), irrespective of their being of a conceptual or nonconceptual nature, 
in other words, that perceiving an object does not come down to forming a belief 
concerning that object, or a disposition to do so.
Although it is by no means easy to provide a unitary characteristic of con­
ceptual, and hence also nonconceptual, content3, some criteria of the former might 
be brought out4. It is assumed that, for experiential content to be considered con­
ceptual, all of the criteria must be jointly satisfied. The criteria in question involve:
(a) Compositionality: conceptual content (CC) is functionally determined by its 
constituents; to put it differently, it is a function of a composition of more 
basic elements;
(b) Cognitive Significance: (i) weak: State m has conceptual content c if subject 
S undergoing state m believes, or is able to believe, that c (in normal epis- 
temic conditions). For example, John's seeing a red tomato has conceptual 
content if John can form a belief that the tomato is red; (ii) strong: CC must 
obey the principle of contradiction: subject S cannot undergo state m with 
conceptual content of the form F and non-F. Cognitive Significance in its 
strong version might otherwise be dubbed a rational constraint criterion, 
for it stipulates that sense experiential content is liable to the same kind of 
limitations which are imposed on all meaningful thought (and speech)5;
(c) Reference Determinacy: CC has a semantic value understood along the 
lines of the Fregean principle that sense of an expression (Sinn) determines 
its reference (Bedeutung). Metaphorically speaking, concepts provide tools 
by means of which rational subjects "grasp" mind-independent entities.
k k k
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section I, I briefly consider 
McDowell's conceptualist interpretation, hinting at some corollaries of this read­
ing, which, apparently, do not quite apply to Kant. In Section II, I introduce some 
basic Kantian notions, such as representation (Vorstellung) and concept (Begriff), 
and distinctions, such as that between intuition and concept, sensibility and un- 
derstanding, spontaneity and receptivity. What McDowell downplays is the fact 
that the distinction between the faculties of sensibility and understanding, in most
3 Cf. Frege [1952] pp. 42-43. Frege refrained from providing a definition of concept, as he doubted 
whether such a definition would be possible.
4 Cf. Gunther [2003] -  the Introduction.
5 The criterion in question is challenged in Crane [1988], analyzing a waterfall illusion example. 
According to Crane, this sort of illusions testify for nonconceptuality of sense experiential content. 
Crane's argument is addressed in Gunther [2001].
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of the cases, runs along the same lines as the distinction between receptivity and 
spontaneity. Therefore, the thesis that "conceptual capacities" operate at the very 
"lowest" level of "taking in" sense impressions turns out rather exaggerated, if not 
altogether false. In Section III, I develop an argumentation for what might be 
called Kant's nonconceptualism, based on the Transcendental Aesthetic, and some 
pre-Critical writings, such as the Inaugural Dissertation and the 1768 essay on the 
differentiation of regions in space. Most importantly, it is to be shown that Kant's 
theory of the pure forms of intuition and pure intuitions themselves, i.e. time and 
space, allows to further a claim that underlying all cognitive content are noncon­
ceptual representations of an embodied subject's location in one spatiotemporal 
framework.
I. M cD ow ells Kant
What McDowell identifies as his "Kantian background"6 comes down to 
emphasizing Kant's famous statement from the introductory passages of the Tran­
scendental Logic, i.e. a remark about thoughts without intuitional content being 
empty and intuitions without concepts (unconceptualized intuitions) being blind7. 
McDowell interprets the remark as expressing what might be called a Cooperation 
Thesis (in short, CT), which I shall formulate as stating that:
CT: Neither sensibility, nor understanding ("conceptual capacities"), when 
taken alone, are capable of providing representational content: in order that 
such content be delivered, intuitions and concepts must be combined to- 
gether, or, in the Kantian parlance, synthesized into a representation (in 
other words, they must cooperate to form a representation)8.
CT entails that no perceptual content can be obtained without conceptual 
capacities operating at the level of taking in the information provided by the 
senses, unless it is to lack representational properties. What I call "representational 
properties" of mental content can be understood as object-directedness of that con-
6 Cf. McDowell [1994] p. 4.
7 Cf. Kant [1998] A 5 1 /B 75.
8 Cf. McDowell [1994] p. 9: "The original Kantian thought was that empirical knowledge results 
from a co-operation between receptivity and spontaneity". See also McDowell [1998] p. 471: "This 
picture of visual experiences as conceptual shapings o f  visual consciousness [italics added -  A.T.] is al- 
ready deeply Kantian, in the way it appeals to sensibility and understanding so as to make sense of 
how experiences have objective purport". Also ibid., p. 488: "Kant suggests an understanding of 
thoughts having objective purport that centres on the immediate presentness of objects to concep­
tual consciousness in intuition".
59
Anna Tomaszewska Is perception concept-dependent according to Kant?
tent. One represents an object, in thought, imagination, or sense-experience, if 
one's thought, imagination, or sense-experience is about that object. Surely, what 
one's thought etc. is about is the content of one's thought etc. If content lacked 
representational properties, it would be, so to speak, cognitively empty; in other 
words, it would have no semantic value and it could not provide a basis for judg- 
ments.
As obvious as the above argument stands, it is less evident whether its for- 
mulation is Kantian in spirit. When Kant stated that "thoughts without content are 
empty", he indeed meant content delivered by the faculty of intuition (sensibility), 
but he did not mean to imply that such thoughts are necessarily meaningless. On 
the contrary, they do not have objective validity (they do not refer to an object) but 
they may have meaning (the Fregean Sinn). Such thoughts result from the applica- 
tion of unschematized categories in judgments, that is, from not restricting the 
scope of these judgments to objects of the senses. Thus, they are empty in the sense 
that they have no empirical application, and thereby deliver no empirical cognition.
I am not entirely sure whether this also makes them deprived of any semantic 
value whatsoever and insensitive to truth-valuation.
Now, let me take a look at the other part of Kant's "slogan", namely that 
"intuitions without concepts are blind"9. For McDowell, this means that noncon­
ceptual, or unconceptualized, intuitions lack representational content, and there- 
fore they are like "bare presences" which "cannot be a ground of anything"10, 
more specifically, they cannot figure as reasons, or justifications, for empirical be- 
liefs, and so they have no cognitive significance. But it is not so obvious that Kant 
would agree to the statement that unconceptualized intuitions are deprived of rep­
resentational content. Recall an example he gives in his Logic, of a "savage" who 
"sees a house in the distance, the use of which [s]he does not know"11. The differ- 
ence between her and a person who knows the purpose of the object presented lies 
in the form of her knowledge, rather than its matter (object), which is in both cases 
the same: both persons can see a house. Whereas the savage's "form of knowl­
edge" consists in intuition alone, the other person's "form of knowledge" is "intui- 
tion and concept combined"12. And intuition itself, albeit unconceptualized, does,
9 This part of the "slogan", as understood by McDowell, is applied in his rendering of Wittgen- 
stein's Private Language Argument. Cf. McDowell [1994] pp. 18-23. According to McDowell, the 
central idea of the argument is that "a  bare presence cannot be a ground of anything" (p. 19) and it 
aims at "a  general rejection of the Given" (p. 18).
10 See the footnote above.
II Cf. Kant [1992] p. 24.
12 Ibid.
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according to Kant, present an object. One might compare Kant's distinction be­
tween these two forms of knowledge to F. Dretske's distinction between thing- 
awareness and fact-awareness13. Dretske thinks that it is not necessary, for a sub- 
ject of experience, to be in possession of a given concept in order to be aware of 
(consciously represent) a thing this concept refers to: for example, a mouse can 
smell a burning toast without ever being capable of forming a belief that the toast is 
burning, this specific awareness exerting an impact on the mouse's behaviour. The 
mouse and the savage are conscious, though not self-conscious, in the Leibnizian 
sense which requires the capability of forming a judgement for an individual to be 
ascribed the possession of self-consciousness.
One may wonder what made the conceptualist interpretation seem true to 
some philosophers14. I think that one could be inclined to enter McDowell's inter- 
pretative route first and foremost on the basis of a general notion of the purpose of 
Kant's transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding, in par- 
ticular -  the famous statement about the " I  think", which "m ust be able to accom- 
pany all my representations" (B 132), endowing unity on the manifold of experien- 
tial content and bringing it under the rule of the categories; and also a less famous 
but a bit ambiguous statement from paragraph A 97 of the Critique o f  Pure Reason, 
which reads in the original: "Diese Begriffe nun, welche a priori das reine Denken 
bei jeder Erfahrung enthalten, finden wir an den Kategorien" ("Now these con­
cepts, which contain a priori the pure thinking in every experience, we find in the 
categories."). If all experiences "contain" the categories as their necessary condi- 
tions and if all experiences, or representations, involve self-awareness ("I think"), 
then indeed for Kant all representational content would be identical with concep- 
tual content, and an ascription of experience to a subject would automatically en- 
tail an ascription of a belief (or a disposition to belief), formed on the basis of the 
experience, to her. Insofar as experience is to provide information about its objects, 
its content must be conceptually structured and remain exposed to constant "ra- 
tional scrutiny" by the subject of experience. Perhaps, then, one may do justice to 
the reading promoted by McDowell -  though, for some reasons or other, he makes 
no reference to the passages mentioned -  in that one distinguishes two strands 
present in Kant's theory of empirical cognition: the above outlined "transcenden- 
tal-philosophical" strand, and a "psychological" one, which I hinted at when cit-
13 Cf. Dretske [1993].
14 Noteworthy, in the Introduction to an anthology of texts on nonconceptualism, Gunther [2003] 
identifies a Kantian inspiration behind conceptualism of McDowell, B. Brewer, S. Sedivy and oth- 
ers.
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ing the example with the savage and which I will elaborate on in the forthcoming 
sections. The first one involves a normative claim in that it makes it possible to 
sort out non-empirical (a priori) principles inherent in our idea of empirical cogni- 
tion, whereas the second one focuses on a description of what happens in cogni- 
tive processes.
However that might be, conceptualism is quite a contentious standpoint it- 
self, according to some authors, too "coarse" to account for some phenomenologi- 
cal intricacies of experience, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, resulting in a 
conception of experience which makes its scope limited to adult human beings: for 
surely one cannot ascribe possession of conceptual capacities to human infants or 
non-linguistic animals. Does then any conception of experience apply to them at 
all? How can they be treated as learning and developing their cognitive skills? 
Two kinds of arguments: from phenomenology of experience and from develop- 
mental psychology are most frequently adopted by the defenders of nonconceptu- 
alism. The first group of arguments focuses on a generic distinction between per- 
ceptual and conceptual content, the former being "richer" or more "fine-grained" 
than the latter. F. Dretske15, e.g., distinguishes between digital and analogue in- 
formational content which corresponds to the conceptual vs. nonconceptual (per- 
ceptual) content distinction. Perceptual content is analogue, and hence nonconcep­
tual, since no judgement formulated on its basis conveys the whole information 
encoded in the content. In fact, conceptualization of perceptual content entails loss 
of information, much like abstraction on some accounts of concept-formation.
The second group of arguments derives from developmental psychology 
and psychology of animals. According to J. L. Bermudez, "theories of nonconcep- 
tual content offer promising ways of dealing with problems in several areas of sci- 
entific psychology. It seems, from work both in animal learning theory and devel- 
opmental psychology, that a form of intentional explanation is required to account 
for the behaviour of creatures which it is not appropriate to describe as concept- 
using. Such explanations clearly require the ascription of states with nonconcep­
tual contents"16. The hypothesis of nonconceptual representational content helps, 
e.g., to explain why babies "grasp" the principle of object permanence -  they per- 
ceive objects, rather than sense impressions in disarray, or how Bermudez puts it, 
"a  booming, buzzing confusion of sensations"17 -  even though they have no mas- 
tery of the concept of object at the very early stage of their growth (and the theorist
15 Cf. Dretske [1981].
16 Bermudez [1995] pp. 336-7 (italics added -  A.T.).
17 Ibid., p. 337.
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does not want to become committed to nativism!). As shown by dishabituation 
experiments18, babies behave as i f  they were making inferences requiring the em- 
ployment of the concept of object. They cannot make inferences, however, since 
making inferences requires a wide range of capacities which infants do not pos- 
sess, such as formulating judgements, providing justifications for them, attributing 
a logical value to them etc. Therefore, they must represent the object in a certain 
way; otherwise, they would not react with surprise to its seemingly losing, in the 
experiment, some of the properties constitutive of its being an object. The infants' 
way of representing (perceiving) objects must be, on this cognitive-psychological 
hypothesis, other than conceptual.
II. The Kantian notion of representation
There have already been formulated statements in which the concepts of 
representation and representational content were employed without, however, 
making clear whether these concepts, as used today, have much in common with 
their counterpart (i.e. Vorstellung) used by Kant. Now before I take a look at how 
Kant employs the concept of representation, let me try to briefly characterize the 
contemporary context in which it occurs. In some areas of scientific and philoso- 
phical psychology, the concept of representation serves as a useful tool for the ex- 
planation of behaviour of not only rational human beings, but also non-linguistic 
animal creatures. Within the past decade, one of the issues dominating in the phi- 
losophy of mind and perception was whether representational content-ascriptions 
can be performed on the subpersonal level of explanation on which no belief- 
ascriptions can be made19. Representations would then have to play a role of in- 
termediaries in explaining why two different creatures can react differently to the 
same set of stimuli in (qualitatively) identical circumstances.
On the account provided by F. Dretske, in Naturalizing the Mind20, represen­
tation is defined as a physical carrier of information. Accordingly, the carrier be- 
comes distinguished from the content (information). Representations are states 
endowed with representational functions, i.e. functions of indicating certain con- 
tents. Dretske divides representations into conceptual and perceptual, associating
18 Bermudez mentions a "drawbridge experiment" in which infants behave as i f  they possessed the 
concept of the impenetrability of an object -  they show surprise when a rotating screen seems to 
pass through an object placed behind it; cf. ibid., p. 338.
19 Cf. Bermudez [1995], Dennett [1996], McDowell [1994a].
20 Cf. Dretske [1995].
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the former with whatever kind of thought (belief, judgment etc.)21, and the latter -  
with the deliverances of sensibility. Perceptual representations, and perceptual 
representational content, are independent from the conceptual ones but not vice 
versa, hence, to recall an earlier distinction, fact-awareness is built upon thing- 
awareness.
The first thing which may strike one as evident, when comparing the above 
account with the Kantian one, is that it does not demand that representation be 
attributed to a self-conscious mind, as a specifically mental function; there may be 
extra- or non-mental representations either (such as in pressure gauges or speed- 
ometers). Besides, Kant seems not to draw a clear borderline between the act of 
representing and the object (as) represented, that is between a mental function and 
the content it points at. Little wonder, then, that the early readers and students of 
Kant tended to grant representation (Vorstellung) with a partly subjective and a 
partly objective status22. Kant's division of representations is presented in para- 
graph A 320/B  377 of the Critique o f  Pure Reason, as illustrated by the diagram be- 
low:
REPRAESENTATIO
PERCEPTIO
SENSATIO COGNITIO
subjective perception, 
modification of inner sense
INTUITUS CONCEPTUS
singular,
immediately refers to an object t or self
EMPIRICAL PURE
NOTIO 
derives from 
understanding
IDEA, CONCEPT OF 
REASON
goes beyond possible 
experience
21 How can thought be physical in nature? What, supposedly, is at stake here is a distinction be­
tween a content and an underlying state: physical (material) states may provide a basis for non- 
physical contents in the sense that if no such state occurred, no contents could be given.
22 For a discussion of the concept of representation see, e.g., S. Maimon's letter to Kant (September 
20, 1791) in Kant [1967].
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Thus, intuitions belong to the class of knowledge-delivering representations 
(cognitiones). Noteworthy, Kant narrowed the notion of concept (conceptus, Begriff) 
to general or discursive conscious objective representation. In De mundi sensibilis 
atque intelligibilis forma ac principiis23, though, he would rather stick -  at least, 
nominally -  to the Wolffian understanding of Begriff, as is evident from his talking 
about the concept of time and the concept of space. According to Wolff, a concept 
(Begriff) relates to "whatever representation (Vorstellung) of things in our 
thoughts", either by an image (im Bilde), or by a word (im Worte), or by means of 
signs (durch Zeichen)24. Thus, Wolff identifies representations with concepts: to 
represent means, for him, to conceive. For Kant, in the Critical period, however, 
the notion of representation gains priority over the notion of concept. Representa­
tion, in the most general sense, relates to the whole class of mental functions and/ 
or their contents, and conception -  only to a sub-class of them.
What is the relation between concepts and intuitions in Kant's epistemol- 
ogy? Do they have anything in common25? What kind of "cognitions" (informa- 
tional content) do they deliver? Are they, as "forms of knowledge", mutually de­
pendent, mutually independent or is one class of conscious representations de­
pendent upon the other? Again, terminological distinctions may prove instructive. 
Both at the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic and in the opening passages 
of the Transcendental Logic, Kant distinguishes sensibility, the lower cognitive fac- 
ulty, which is merely receptive and which delivers intuitions, and understanding, 
the higher cognitive faculty, which is spontaneous and which delivers, or produces, 
concepts -  as sources of two disjunctive and complementary classes of conscious 
objective representations26. The intuitive mode of cognition requires that sensa- 
tions be structured by the pure forms of sense perception: time and space. Since 
the structuring is not done by the higher -  spontaneous -  cognitive faculty, it does 
not involve conceptualization. And since it is done by receptivity, the very struc- 
ture by means of which sensations become ordered has to be already there instead 
of being made out of the given material (which Kant calls a "manifold").
23 In Kant [1968].
24 Cf. Wolff [1910] p. 9.
25 These questions are by no means naive. Suffice it to say that the very intuitions vs. concepts (resp. 
sensibility vs. understanding) dualism is not an innocent conception at all, i.e. a conception which 
would not implicate any disputable presuppositions. For one may ask: why (on what grounds) is 
thinking distinguished from perceiving? Cannot perceiving be spontaneous, active, rather than 
passive? According to Kant, it cannot; as I read him, unlike Berkeley, he is no constructivist as re- 
gards sense perception. More on that issue in Falkenstein [2004].
26 See also Kant [1992] pp. 26-27.
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On the basis of the above statements, let me formulate the following Het- 
erogeneity Thesis (in short, HT):
HT: Intuitions and concepts derive from two different, mutually irreducible 
sources: sensibility and understanding. Sensibility is receptive, understand­
ing is spontaneous and they cannot exchange their functions.
From the HT, it seems to follow that information processing takes place 
only in the understanding, and that it involves concepts. Are then perceptual 
states non-informational? Not necessarily. One should avoid making inferences 
about the kind of content from the kind of cognitive act directed at that content. It 
would be rather odd to suppose that the particular dog I see at a particular mo­
ment must be different from the one I think about at the very same moment, and 
so that it is only by reference to cognitive acts that one can individuate their con­
tent (what these acts are about).
The picture which emerges from the above considerations may seem not to 
be quite consistent, though. For it has been said, on the one hand, that intuition 
alone can provide cognition of objects (see the diagram with the distinctions from 
the passage A 320/B  377 of the Critique) but, on the other hand, the Cooperation 
Thesis (see Section I), which says that only intuitions combined, or synthesized 
with concepts can deliver empirical cognition, still obtains. Besides, HT entails a 
problem: how is that "cooperation" of sensibility and understanding possible? 
What power, or cognitive faculty, motivates the synthesis of the two kinds of het- 
erogeneous cognitions? I would venture a bold answer: none. CT and HT do go 
very well together. The former expresses that (i) knowledge has to be mediated in 
judgments and (ii) experience provides foundations for knowledge, in other 
words, something without which we, human beings, could not start off as subjects 
of cognition. HT, on the other hand, suggests that human mind possesses a sort of 
"architectonic" structure: its functions are built upon one another, with the most 
fundamental one(s) at the bottom.
Does perception of an object, then, occur at the level of intuition or does it 
occur no sooner than after all the "manifold" has been brought together by the 
"synthesizing" activity of the understanding? On the reading outlined, according 
to Kant, perceiving an object requires no more than intuition, and cognition, which 
culminates in forming a judgment based on perception of the object, would be 
possible at the level of self-consciously processing the contents of perception. In 
some notes which help understand his "mature" thought, Kant talked about de- 
grees of knowledge, of which he enumerated the following: (i) an idea (Vorstel- 
lung); (ii) a conscious idea -  perception; (iii) knowledge of a thing as related to
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other things -  identification and differentiation; (iv) conscious knowledge of a 
thing -  cognition. In particular, he admitted that "animals know objects but do not 
cognize them"; (v) conception -  cognition "by the understanding by means of con­
cepts"; (vi) rational cognition, which is perspicuous; and (vii) rational a priori 
comprehension, which is adequate27. As one can clearly see, the degrees are or- 
dered into a hierarchy, so that a lower degree precedes a higher one and a higher 
degree presupposes, or is built upon a lower one but not the other way round. For 
instance, a subject may have a conscious idea of (perceive) a thing (ii) without 
even perceptually recognizing the thing as this or that (iii, iv), let alone forming a 
conception of it (v), but the stage of conception implicates the earlier stages of be­
ing sensibly affected by an object, becoming conscious of it, grasping it on the 
background of relations with other objects, and consciously knowing it as this or 
that.
Concluding: I have provided some textual evidence undermining McDow- 
ell's claim to the effect that the "picture of visual experiences as conceptual shap- 
ings of visual consciousness is already deeply Kantian"28. I have also given textual 
support to the claim that there is no point denying that Kant considered represen­
tations as being about objects (regardless of the "form " of the representations). 
Now time has come to ground my claims in the original Kantian arguments 
throwing more light on the textual evidence gathered.
III. Cognitive significance of nonconceptual content
To form an adequate picture of the role of intuition in Kant's epistemology, 
it is indispensable to see how his ideas developed in the late 1760s. and the early 
1770s. ending up in the theory we find in the Critique o f Pure Reason. Within more 
than a decade Kant was building up arguments which were to become the corner- 
stones of his "Copernican revolution" and transcendental philosophy. The argu- 
ments I intend to examine may be divided into the following groups: (1) argu­
ments for a subjective character of the intuitions of space and time; (2) further de- 
termination of the character of space and time: non-discursive (concept- 
independent) forms of intuition and pure intuitions themselves; (3) arguments for 
the cognitive significance of time and space as providing a basis for all conceptual 
cognition, and in particular guaranteeing synthetic a priori status to judgements of 
geometry and mechanics (science of motion).
27 Cf. Kant [1992] pp. 55-56. One may draw attention to the Cartesian terminological heritage pre- 
sent in these expressions.
28 Cf. McDowell [1998] p. 471.
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As to the first group of arguments, a range of them can be found in Kant's 
1768 essay Concerning the ultimate foundation o f  the differentiation o f  regions in space, 
where, against the Leibnizians, Kant sets out to argue for the absolute character of 
space. In fact, however, what he demonstrates is that the representation of space, 
including all possible spatial relations, finds its source in the embodied subject of 
cognition. Subject- or body-relative are spatial determinations, such as up-down, 
left-right, back-front, and spatial directions, since their reference could not be es- 
tablished otherwise than by reference to a subject's locatedness in some "point" in 
space. "The most accurate of heavenly charts", Kant writes in the essay on the re­
gions, "no matter how accurately I have it in mind, would not in the end enable 
me to know from the known region, for example from the north, on which side of 
the horizon I should seek the rising sun, if, apart from the position of the stars to 
each other, the regions were not determined by the position of the sketch in rela- 
tion to my hands"29. Spatial relations are not abstracted from relations between 
objects, nor from experiences of the relations within the objective realm, because 
such relations and such experiences already presuppose a spatial framework in 
which they become established. But this "spatial framework" is also not some- 
thing given in itself: it originates from a subject endowing her experiences with a 
unique structure. In other words, by means of the pure forms of intuition, the sub- 
ject organizes, and constantly re-organizes, her perceptual field. To give an exam- 
ple: a row of signs read from my left to the right does have a determinate signifi­
cance (meaning), unlike the very same row read from my right to the left, and so 
the signs "in  themselves" have no meaning unless given a specific structure. Ac- 
cording to Kant, space and time cannot be "constructed" out of some more basic 
material -  sensations; they could not retain their a priori status then. On this ac­
count, one should say that the subject does not estimate a distance between two 
perceived objects on the basis of her judging what tactile and visual sensations she 
would have if she changed her position in space; rather, on the basis of her estima- 
tion of a distance, the subject may predict what sensations she would receive if her 
position altered. This intuitive grasp of spatial (and temporal) relations allows the 
subject to guide her behaviour towards (empirical) objects.
The second group of arguments deals with the non-discursive character of 
space and time. Conscious objective representations may be either singular, or 
general and discursive. But neither space, nor time is a general (or discursive) rep- 
resentation30. That is because: (i) one cannot think of many "spaces" ("times") in-
29 Kant [1992] p. 39.
30 Cf. Kant [1998] A 25, B 40, A 32, B 48; also Kant [1968] pp. 63-64, 68-69.
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stantiating the concept "space" ("time"); whatever "space" ("tim e") one would try 
to "cut out" from the whole, it is but a limitation of the all-encompassing represen­
tation of space (time). The relation of particular "spaces" ("times") to the all- 
encompassing space is, therefore, not that of "falling under", as is the case with 
particulars and concepts which the former exemplify; (ii) space is represented as 
an "infinite magnitude", and time -  as "limitless". This means that they contain an 
infinite multiplicity of representations "in" them. To understand what Kant might 
have in mind here, one could imagine that one carries out an analysis of the "con- 
cept" of space or time. Whereas by analyzing a genuine concept one would come 
to a finite set of features composing the concept (i.e. to other concepts), from space 
and time one would not be able to analyze out any set of features. Pure intuitions 
are not composed in any way, they are simple. Empirical content does not consti- 
tute the content of the representations of space and time. Do they have any content 
then? If not, then why does Kant call them not only forms of intuition, but also 
pure intuitions? If they are representations, what do they represent? A natural an- 
swer would be: the mind, since they are ways in which the mind intuits objects (or 
organizes its perceptual field). A plausible hypothesis is that this mind has to be 
embodied, one of its a priori representations including space, itself necessary to 
structure the "manifold" data derivable from outer senses and depending on the 
location and movement of the experiencing subject.
The above arguments are meant to show that time and space are singular 
representations. But in order to demonstrate that they are intuitions, one should 
also prove their immediacy. In what sense can time and space be understood as 
immediate representations of objects? One can say that a representation refers 
immediately to an object if no other representation is required for the object- 
reference to be secured. As pure forms of intuition, time and space are necessary 
for any representation to occur, but it is necessary to make sure whether they are 
also sufficient for that. This requires an employment of the third group of argu­
ments -  the arguments for cognitive significance of the pure forms of intuition. 
Here Kant shows that time and space lie at the ground of all our cognition.
To demonstrate the cognitive significance of pure intuitions, Kant points 
out cases in which by merely conceptual means the subject of cognition would not 
arrive at a particular kind of knowledge. These are cases in which thinking cannot 
replace intuiting, because concepts are -  as one would say today -  too coarse- 
grained to render distinctions which might be represented in intuition, itself suffi­
cient to present us with an object. In his essay on the regions, as well as in the In- 
augural Dissertation, Kant gives examples of incongruent counterparts which il- 
lustrate the point. On Kant's definition, an incongruent counterpart is an "object
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which is completely like and similar to another, although it cannot be included 
exactly within the same limits"31. The examples delivered comprise: two spherical 
triangles, human left and right hands, and a human hand and its reflection in a 
mirror. Kant thinks that a complete description of such objects would not make it 
possible for us to individuate them. It is only in intuition that their -  numerical -  
difference can be spotted. The examples and the argument they further may easily 
be found unconvincing, however. For, it can be noticed, "m y (e.g.) left hand's be- 
ing reflected in a mirror" is a predicate by means of which I can distinguish one 
possible world (in which there is my left hand reflected) from another (in which it 
is not). I think a defender of Kant might argue on the following lines (on the basis 
of her commonsensical insights, rather than knowledge of geometry, in this case): 
there is nothing in the description of a hand and its reflection in a mirror -  even in 
a description in terms of Cartesian coordinates -  that would make me ascribe the 
predicate "left" to one of them. Besides, I see that my left hand is my right one in 
the reflection. How can I account for that? I do not know any laws of geometry 
which explain this phenomenon, nor do I infer this judgment from another one. 
Thus, my knowledge has to be immediate, hence intuitive.
Interestingly enough, Kant contends that the principle of contradiction -  the 
very fundamental principle of all meaningful thought -  cannot be properly under- 
stood without reference to time. In the Inaugural Dissertation, he remarks: "In- 
deed so far is it from being the case that anyone has ever yet deduced from else- 
where and explained the concept of time with the help of the reason, that rather 
the principle of contradiction itself has the same concept [i.e. time -  A.T.] as a 
premise and bases itself on the concept as its condition"32. For predicating A and 
non-A of a thing amounts to no contradiction unless the condition of simultaneity 
is added, and simultaneity is one of the determinations of time. Therefore, since 
the principle of contradiction constitutes all thinking, one shall arrive at the con- 
clusion that in the order of the conditions of cognition time-awareness, which 
"rests on an internal law of the mind"33 comes before, and so constitutes the very 
first principle of thought. This seems to suggest that the temporally structured 
content of consciousness needs not be conceptual, or perhaps even eligible for 
conceptualization.
Last but not least, the arguments for synthetic a priori character of two sci- 
entific disciplines: geometry and mechanics, confirm the cognitive significance of
31 Kant [1968] p. 41.
32 Ibid., p. 67.
33 Ibid.
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pure intuitions in the sense that they grant them with the role of sources of a cer­
tain kind of cognition. The argument from geometry formulated in the Transcen­
dental Aesthetic has also been recognized as Kant's first argument for transcen­
dental idealism in the Critique o f  Pure Reason, in particular, the transcendental ide- 
ality of the pure forms of intuition. Kant claims that the laws of geometry cannot 
be inferred by way of a mere analysis of geometrical concepts. They cannot be 
formulated prior to (in the non-temporal sense of priority) and without presup- 
posing the construction of a corresponding object in intuition. Thus, geometrical 
knowledge is not analytic but synthetic. It is also a priori, i.e. necessary and uni- 
versally valid, to the extent that there can be no exceptions from a geometrical 
law34. If there were, geometrical knowledge would be derivable from experience, 
and hence a posteriori, empirical rather than pure. Since geometry requires the 
intuition of space as underlying its laws, the very possibility of that discipline en- 
tails, on Kant's view, the necessity of a pure a priori intuition of space35.
Concluding remarks
Although it is difficult to find in philosophical literature a unitary charac- 
teristic of nonconceptual content, the contemporary nonconceptualists, as R. 
Hanna remarked36, owe a lot to Kant. Without exaggeration, one may indeed grant 
that the author of the three Critiques gave support to the kind of philosophical 
reflection which does not disregard the particularly human dimension of cogni­
tion, more specifically the fact that the subject of cognition is an embodied subject. 
Kant says that the idea of space and time is not inborn; it is rather a "law  of the 
mind" governing its proper conduct and use in the environment. We are not born 
with the ideas of space and time, but we make use of them, so to speak, as part of 
our nature, on the very first encounter with the world, before we can employ any 
empirical and/ or reflective concepts.
34 How can geometry be universally and necessarily valid while it in fact describes the way of func- 
tioning of the human mind? Would there be no geometry if human beings were equipped with a 
different kind of intuition or would there be a different geometry then? These are crucial questions 
but I have to delay addressing them on another occasion.
35 It is, perhaps, quite a contingent fact that geometry, as a branch of knowledge, exists (a world 
without human beings, or without human beings engaged in geometrical investigations is easily 
conceivable), but it is necessary that, once it exists, it had a synthetic a priori, and thus necessary, 
character. Surely, Kant did not, and could not predict the 20th-century development of non- 
Euclidean geometries. On the other hand, his claims may perhaps remain in power when regarded 
on the appropriate level of generality.
36 Cf. Hanna [2005] p. 248.
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Recalling the criteria of conceptuality mentioned at the beginning, one shall 
note that, for sure, they are not satisfied by all kinds of representational content in 
Kant's theory of experience.
(a) Pure intuitions thwart the Compositionality criterion: they are not a func- 
tion of more basic elements, nor do they presuppose a synthesis of the ex- 
periential "manifold", rather they -  being non-discursive and immediately 
referring to the object -  make this synthesis possible.
(b) The a priori intuitional content is cognitively significant in that it must pre- 
cede belief-formation. Obviously, it does not provide the content for beliefs, 
but rather -  in that it remains belief- or concept-independent -  a basis for 
this kind of content (at least in the case of empirical knowledge, for "con­
cepts without intuitions are empty").
(c) Concepts do not suffice, in some cases, to individuate objects given in ex- 
perience, and so the criterion of Reference Determinacy becomes under- 
mined. In the case of incongruent counterparts, it is only in intuition that 
two objects can be distinguished from one another.
On such an interpretation of Kant's transcendental epistemology, granting 
intuition the prime role in the acquisition of experience and knowledge, McDow- 
ell's allegedly Kantian thesis about receptivity being impregnated with spontane­
ity throughout fades away as unconvincing, not only because it disregards the let- 
ter, but, most importantly, because it stifles the spirit of Kant's philosophical en- 
terprise. For, as I have been trying to show, no matter if the arguments mentioned 
in Section III are themselves plausible and would withstand a thoroughgoing criti- 
cism or not, there is much evidence that, for Kant, it is rather spontaneity that is 
"impregnated with receptivity throughout": the objective world has its source in 
the a priori laws of sensibility.
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